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Classical democracy: 
a model for the 
modern world?
KENNETH ROYCE MOORE says that the story of Athenian democracy should 
give pause to today’s utopians  
lato’s Laws proposes a unique and interesting form of government for 
the hypothetical city-state (polis) outlined there and called Magnesia. 
It is on the one hand nominally a system of participatory democracy 
with a lively political culture. On the other, it is an authoritarian 
state, ruled by an elite and secretive council that carefully scrutinises 
its subjects and interferes in their lives in ways that today conjure shadows of 
the bygone Soviet Union. The electoral system is set up so that those in power 
may remove any potentially unwanted candidate. And the unelected, supreme 
council (known as the Vigilance Committee or synlogos nukterinos) which has 
final say over the interpretation of the law and being the only ones invested with 
the ability to change the law, have close ties with the official state religion so as, 
to the modern reader, to recollect the Assembly of Experts of the Leadership in 
post-revolutionary Iran. The Vigilance Committee has at its disposal the highly 
trained Guardians of the Laws as their agents of enforcement with the state-
sanctioned monopoly on violence. 
Education, religion and the legal system reinforce patriotism and obedience 
to the Magnesian authorities. From their days as students in its state-run schools, 
all citizens of Magnesia, whatever their abilities, will be impressed with a sense 
of obedience and conformity to their constitution and the importance of each 
fulfilling his/her proper role in society. A young Magnesian may grow up to 
become one of the many citizens whose underlying purpose is to practice virtue 
(but not to partake of higher political offices) or, if their aptitude so admits, they 
may become a Guardian of the Laws or even a member of the powerful nukterinos 
council. The Magnesian education represents a fundamental means of social 
control and ideological inculcation from a very early age and thus functions 
as an agent for the perpetuation of such state-sanctioned ideals as obedience, 
liberty (which is here specially defined with respect to obedience) intelligence 
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(also specifically defined) and civic concord. This is in part considered necessary 
considering the degrees of freedom of choice that the Athenian Stranger allows 
his citizens in terms of their political system.
We can try to approach Magnesia as if it were a real polis of the ancient world, 
informed by our knowledge of that era, and attempt to grasp its characteristics. 
Property law is one of many areas of life directly regulated by the Magnesian 
state and it gives us some indication as to the polis’ potential population. 
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Balance is to be maintained in Magnesia through permanent marriages with 
an economic basis in land-division.1 Each of the prescribed 5,040 land units is 
divided into two parts and no citizen may have more land than any other. Any 
population surplus exceeding that which can be reasonably contained within the 
5,040 family units will be shipped off to a colony.2 Here too is another difference 
in terms of Magnesia’s semi-private landholdings based on the family unit as 
opposed to the communal property of the Republic.3 One may refer to them 
as semi-private since these lots can never be purchased or sold. I estimate the 
total population to be approximately 30,240 citizens (male and female, including 
children). If we take Greaves approximation of 50%, and there is every reason 
to imagine this figure to be applicable to Magnesia if not a higher one, then we 
may assume a total population of citizens and their slaves living in the urban 
centre at around 60,480.4 This does not, of course, take into account those 
citizens and slaves who reside mainly on the country estates outwith the urban 
centre, the resident aliens (mainly ambassadors, merchants and educators) or 
state-owned, municipal slaves who maintain infrastructure and are quartered 
in the city.5 In fact, I am tempted to add another 5,040 or more slaves to the 
total given that each hoplite is likely to have a slave to bear his or (perhaps in 
some cases) her arms; however, I will allow the possibility of other slaves, already 
accounted for, performing a double duty.6 An attempt to estimate the total 
population for Magnesia, including slaves and resident aliens, with roughly 3 
square kilometres containing the urban centre and 258 for the hinterland, gives 
figures of around 150,700 persons occupying about 261 square kilometres. Even 
when taken conservatively, these figures represent a significant civic population 
to be governed by ancient or modern standards.
In addition to including women in some public roles, albeit to a clearly 
limited extent, Plato’s narrator has also admitted an uncharacteristically high 
degree of democracy into the second-best polis. Its size may necessitate such an 
extensively bureaucratic system and it makes economic sense to take advantage 
of their superior education and moulded judgement to put the populace to 
work at governing itself. Magnesia’s partially democratic election system is also 
moderated by the hypothetical society’s other peculiarities. As Bobonich says, 
this political activity on the part of the Magnesians, 
“that is, participation in the social institutions of the just city aimed at 
furthering the common good, is good in itself and forms an important 
part of each citizen’s happiness”.7 
All citizens, engaged as they are in the pursuit of arete¯ (virtue/excellence), 
should posses a better techne¯ (skill, specialised knowledge) for political decisions 
than the populace of the average Greek democracy. This utopianisation of 
democracy is part of the reason why Magnesian women are granted such an 
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unprecedented political status. 
Politicians are not paid. Their needs are either met by the state or through 
their own resources as permitted under law. Counsellors in the boule (council) 
of 360 are chosen according to property class (90 from each of the 4). 8 Their role, 
presumably, is to be comparable to the boule¯ of Classical, democratic Athens in 
that they would set the agenda for the general assembly (ekklesia). The latter will 
consist of all citizen males of the first and second classes who are compelled to 
attend under penalty of fine; although, the right to do so is afforded to “anyone 
who wishes” and extends likewise to the other two, lower property classes as 
democratically optional.9 The wording of the statement “anyone who wishes”, 
echoing the democratic values of Athens after Solon’s reforms, would also appear 
to include certain Magnesian women as well – if not all of them. The function 
of the assembly in Magnesia, however, appears to be more bureaucratic than 
its real-world counterpart since Plato’s hypothetical polis is largely regulated by 
legal statutes, enforced by the Guardians of the Laws, magistrates, numerous 
community wardens (including Marriage Guardians, women who go into 
newlyweds homes to encourage reproduction and proper rearing of children) 
with varying remits and presided over by the supreme Vigilance Committee in 
a kind of surveillance culture that puts that of the previous UK government to 
shame. Plato’s narrator only mentions that the assembly will decide on matters 
of immigration, although, presumably they will have other administrative 
functions as well.10 This is all that Plato’s narrator has to say about them apart 
from the assertion that assembly members must not engage in personal, verbal 
abuse with one another during meetings as was regularly the case in Athens.11 
The bureaucratic system of Magnesia will eliminate a great deal of democratic 
wrangling and it appears to be a kind of ‘rubber stamp’ democracy in practice. 
The assembly will not be allowed to make laws.
There are 37 other special officials of the state apart from the elected boule¯ 
and the unelected nukterinos council. These are chosen through an elaborate 
system of voting by deletion. The list of nominees for “ministers of the laws” 
and military commanders, such as hipparchs, phylarchs and taxiarchs, are to be 
placed in public for thirty days and “anyone who thinks it fit” may remove any 
name they wish.12 This feature demonstrates some of the limitations imposed 
on democracy inasmuch as certain people might always tend to be excluded or 
included by the time of election. The nukterinos council, Guardians and sitting 
officials will scrutinise these undertakings with care and may remove or add 
names themselves at any juncture in the election. The outgoing ministers still in 
office take the 300 remaining names and place them on a ballot for the citizens 
to cast a second round of votes, again by deletion. 
The magistrates choose a hundred names from the second short-listing and 
then “anyone who wishes” cast actual votes for them. The 37 who receive the 
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most votes will be examined by the sitting magistrates and, if they pass, are 
then installed into office (753c-d). It is unclear whether or not the “anyone who 
wishes” who are permitted to strike names from the list of candidates and then to 
vote on them refers to those who possess heavy weapons or are from the citizen-
populace at large. The Athenian Stranger appears to say that the selection of 
candidates for nomination is to be limited to those who possess the requisite 
arms. The actual short-listing and voting would seem to be the privilege of the 
citizen populace as a whole including as many men and as many women who 
wish to do so. It is unclear whether women will sit on the supreme nukterinos 
council.13 Since its members are appointed from the eldest of the Guardians of 
the Laws, it is possible to assume that they might be included – although this is 
never explicitly specified.14 Women’s role in higher Magnesian politics is clearly 
marginal, but their implied potential, along with their more public role generally, 
emphasises the contrast between the ideal world of a second-best utopia and the 
realities of ancient Greece.
The Laws, as Saunders says, 
“gives a powerful impression of the range of activities under the control 
of nomos (custom, law, habitual practice etc.) in one sense or another”.15 
As in the Republic, there are to be Guardians of the Laws whose job it is 
to police the Magnesian state in every conceivable way, with their teams of 
wardens, and enforce the law in both the public and private spheres. Men and 
women will have to regard them as figures of state authority as they have the 
power to fine and detain lawbreakers in accord with the city’s statutes. There 
will also be female Marriage Guardians, Market Wardens, City Wardens, Rural 
Wardens and various other bureaucrats to regulate and oversee the numerous 
slaves, the city’s foreign educators, other non-citizens and orphans explicitly and 
many other areas as well.16 
Perhaps Plato had a model for his Guardians (both in the Republic and 
the Laws) in the form of an Athenian institution that reputedly existed before 
Perikles. In the aristocratic council of the Areopagos, as it was prior to Ephialtes’ 
reforms (early 5th century BCE), there may have been comparable guardians. 
Aristotle says that Solon
“assigned the council of the Areopagos to the duty of guarding the laws, 
acting as before as the supervisor of the constitution.”
He goes on to indicate that Ephialtes reduced its authority over guarding the 
constitution and assigned some of them to the council of the five hundred and 
others to the demos (the civic populace) and the popular courts.17 It is possible 
that this alleged institution of the pre-Periklean Areopagos was the inspiration, 
or at least an inspiration, for the Athenian Stranger’s Guardians of the Laws.18 
Cicero, heavily influenced by Plato, commends “the Greeks” for establishing 
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officers called nomophylakes, who guarded the text of the laws, observing the 
actions of citizens and calling them to obedience.19 It is not possible to say whether 
such guardians actually existed in ancient Athens and, if so, that they were an 
inspiration for Plato.20 His nomophylakes appear to have more in common with 
the Spartan ephors.21 As Morrow says, they add a Lakonian “monarchical element 
in the city”.22 Their superiors in Magnesia also recollect other Spartan elements 
rather than Athenian.23
Above all the various guardians, and drawn from the eldest of the Guardians 
of the Laws, is the synlogos nukterinos, “Nocturnal Council” or “Vigilance 
Committee”.24 Its gerontocratic character is one of many points of similarity to 
the Spartan gerousia, the members of which were also required to be over the age 
of 60.25 The Athenian Stranger says that his Nocturnal Council will function in a 
‘watchdog’ capacity, ideally just making recommendations, and will serve to keep 
the ship of state on course.26 Its powers, as with the gerousia, are considerably 
broader than this innocent-sounding remit suggests. Its membership includes 
the eldest Guardians of the Laws and the ministers of education past and present. 
These exert influence over such areas as religious events, education, music, 
choruses and all civic activities that involve the inculcation of morality and 
accepted ideology. The nukterinos council also has also been afforded the unique 
authority, only on rare and special occasions we are told, to alter Magnesia’s 
laws. 
Brisson proposes the term “Vigilance Committee” instead of the more 
traditional rendering of “Nocturnal Council”. As he indicates, this body 
“sees to it that the laws of the City are based on the order manifest in the 
universe, [and] becomes the most essential element in the project of the 
Laws”.27 
The term nukterinos “connotes the idea of wakefulness” and, indeed, the 
Vigilance Committee is meant to meet each day from before dawn until the sun 
has risen.28 Morrow suggests that the inspiration for the Vigilance Committee 
must be the Academy itself since, as he says, 
“its studies bear an unmistakable resemblance to those cultivated in 
Plato’s Academy, and the purpose they are intended to serve is identical...
viz. to apply philosophy to the saving of the city-state”.29 
Like the Academy, the members of the Vigilance Committee will have been 
inducted into the innermost mysteries of philosophy. Also, not unlike certain of 
the Academy’s membership, they too will hold real administrative powers over 
the state.
It was generally agreed that Solon founded the classical, democratic 
Athenian republic as we tend to think of it mainly by admitting the lower 
classes into the democratic process through jury duty on appeals courts. After 
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which, the democrats gained greater powers by degrees over time. It is therefore 
not surprising that Plutarch himself later wrote Solon’s biography whereas 
Kleisthenes, a major constitutional reformer at the level of policy, and arguably a 
more significant proponent of democracy, only gets a notable mention. The rapid 
changes in the government of Athens in the later part of the 5th century brought 
the issue of the “ancestral constitution”, or “ancestral law”, to the forefront.30 
There was an intellectual opposition to the restored democracy in Athens at this 
time. Amongst them, as Finley says, “the appeal to the ancestral constitution 
retained vitality”.31 Isokrates the rhetorician and his wealthy followers, ostensibly 
eschewing oligarchy, favoured a “mixed constitution” that hearkened back to 
some non-specific, idealised past.32 Plato even has his fictional Socrates praise 
him at the end of the Phaedrus, though this may in fact be sarcasm. Ancestral 
constitutions had appeal. 
Suffice it to say that, Plato took a different approach to the issue. He was about 
18 when Kleitophon moved the amendment that opened the debate on the subject 
of an “ancestral constitution”.33 As a member of one of Athens’ more prominent 
political families, Plato had close personal connections with some of the chief 
players and a keen eye for the relevant events. When the time came, he set aside 
the historical discussion, without altogether dismissing it, while introducing a 
new method based on reason. His philosophy of government never rested solely 
on ancestral arguments.34 Certainly Plato reveals conservative tendencies and 
his views may have also been informed by recourse to an idealised vision of the 
past. In the Statesman we have an answer to the matter. Perhaps building on the 
works of Gorgias and the sophists,35 Plato’s narrator espouses a novel concept: 
having established that there is a science (episte¯me¯) of politics, he posits that 
the proof of a correct constitution is that it should be based on science and that 
it also has to be scientifically administered. The question of whether or not it is 
historically well grounded becomes largely irrelevant, though, a useful fiction to 
persuade the masses at times. In his dialogues Plato’s narrators typically support 
a particular formulation of aristocratic rule over any other type. The difference 
between his aristocracy and that of the real world lies in the role of philosophy 
in law. “Correct leadership” is, rather strikingly, a science practised only by those 
who have been specially educated in the subject.36 
In the Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger demonstrates that formal legislation in 
a democratic assembly is actually unnecessary and potentially a very dangerous 
thing.37 His analogy describes hypothetical legislators passing and modifying 
laws on medicine and navigation – subjects about which they know little or 
nothing – and how such a process will never successfully navigate ships or cure 
sick people.38 The best constitution therefore is one that is based on science 
informed by the superior insights of philosophy. “That is always Plato’s answer:” 
as Finley says, 
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“of all existing constitutions, even the best are mere imitations of the 
true constitution; the debate over ancestral constitution is a waste of 
time or worse; constitutions cannot be judged by reference to this or that 
past hero or constitution”.39 
They must be the product of science.
The laws of Magnesia are philosophically inspired in their creation. Above 
and beyond all else, it is Philosophy (in the sense of Natural Philosophy which 
holds a broad scientific remit) that is to be the ultimate standard on which 
the rule of nomos is based. The changeability of Magnesia’s laws is extremely 
limited with no legislation as we think of it permitted. As indicated, only the 
philosophically illuminated Vigilance Committee may alter the law and theirs is 
the supreme interpretation of it. As Nightingale says, 
“the lawcode is conceived as a distinct genre of writing which is not only 
elevated above all other modes of discourse but is accorded an almost 
scriptural status”.40 
Nomos here means something like rationally, scientifically and philosophically 
derived laws with permanent binding force. If a historical law is found to be 
philosophically sound, then it will be utilised.41 Plato’s narrator is no stranger to 
borrowing from useful sources. He has repeatedly availed himself of the wealth 
of information in existing legal codes. The Magnesian nomoi have regard for 
ancient custom and ‘unwritten laws’, but these are subordinate to the scrutiny of 
science and the rule of Reason (logos).
The Athenian Stranger may have anticipated George Orwell by two and a 
half millennia in terms of their mutual agreement that there will always arise 
in society those who tend to be ‘more equal’ than others.42 He sometimes refers 
to this as the “rule of symmetrical inequality”43 and it applies to many aspects of 
life.44 The ‘best of the best’ in Magnesia occupy the highest offices in the land. It 
is they who will be afforded the most comprehensive form of education available. 
This class of rulers includes the Guardians of the Laws and the members of the 
Vigilance Committee. The education of the former is the same as that of the 
latter up to a point. They, however, will be expected to continue their studies in 
greater depth. This synod of Magnesia’s elders has a more intense and deeper 
education than the majority of their peers (965a7-9). Their preparation closely 
parallels that of the Guardians of the Laws and the Philosopher Kings/Queens of 
the Republic. As with these, the Magnesians are seemingly not limited by sex in 
the choice of officials for duties of state administration.45 
The Vigilance Committee will be made up of ten of the most senior 
Guardians of the Laws along with the archo¯ ns (ministers) of Education past and 
present.46 They form the executive branch of the government and recollect the 
traditional role of the aristocratic Aereopagos of pre-democratic Athens. They 
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are not dissimilar to the Assembly of Experts of the Leadership of modern-day 
Iran. Magnesia is a gerontocracy, comparable in many ways to Classical Sparta, 
and its elderly leadership exert considerable regulatory power over all state 
institutions such as education, choruses, music, officially sanctioned drinking 
parties and other institutions that inculcate morality.47 The ranks from which 
they are chosen constitute a class unto itself having been especially trained from 
birth in esoteric scholarship for their future role in government. 
The Athenian Stranger indicates that a list must be kept of the intellectual 
and moral capacities of eligible citizens from whom to draw the Guardians of the 
Laws and thence the elite council (968c9-d3). Part of their special educational 
regime requires them to travel abroad in order to observe the laws and customs 
of other peoples. They will return and make their reports to the sitting Vigilance 
Committee. On reflection, some of these foreign practices may be applied to 
Magnesia as is deemed appropriate (951a ff.). This freedom to travel and learn 
will be granted only to senior Guardians of the Laws and magistrates who have 
presumably passed certain levels of qualification making them worthy of it.48 
Many aspects of the Vigilance Committee’s education are omitted from the 
Laws. We are told some of it and may deduce much of the rest. Their command 
of the arts of statecraft must necessarily be excellent since they must be better 
versed in the letter and spirit of Magnesia’s laws than most. The members of 
the nukterinos council are to “posses a more accurate grasp of arete¯, both in 
word and deed, than the majority of people” (964d4-5). They must be paragons of 
civic virtue. In order to achieve this extraordinary status, they undergo intense 
training and scrutiny for at least five decades. One of their primary subjects of 
study will be dialectics. They have to understand that the four virtues of Reason, 
Courage, Moderation and Justice are truly one virtue and “how this is so”.49 They 
must pay attention to the many, but always strive for the ‘One’. Although the 
word ‘dialectic’ is not actually employed in the Athenian Stranger’s discussions 
here or elsewhere in the text, the method of practice that he has outlined is 
unmistakable.50 
The rulers of Magnesia must also be able to apply their philosophical insights 
on “the Beautiful and the Good” to the practice of governance.51 This represents 
one of the more esoteric aspects of their education and clearly distinguishes them 
from the rest of the citizenry who, we are told, “follow only the pronouncements 
of the laws”.52 The Vigilance Committee’s candidates undertake a thorough study 
of divine matters, we are told, so that they might come to an understanding of 
the mysteries of philosophy. Some of these the Athenian Stranger has discussed 
in Book X, but it appears likely that they will utilise other Platonic resources as 
well.53 No Magnesian may serve even as a Guardian of the Laws unless he/she 
has first learned the basics of cosmology and metaphysics.
The Athenian Stranger mentions several subcategories of this education 
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in “divine matters” that will bring about a superior skill of governing for the 
members of the Vigilance Committee and, to a lesser degree, the Guardians of 
the Laws. A primary feature is psychical metaphysics, or the nature of souls. 
They must learn that the soul is the most ancient and divine of things whose 
main activity is that of “perpetually providing being”.54 They should understand 
that the soul is immortal, reincarnates and “rules over all bodies”.55 Since the 
motions of celestial objects are caused by Soul and governed by Reason, they 
also undertake a rigorous study of astronomy, geometry and other such sciences 
that demonstrate this divine principle.56 Finally, they must attain an intense 
comprehension of musical theory and then be able to “apply it harmoniously 
to the institutions and rules of ethics”.57 The esoteric learning of metaphysical 
matters appears to be a primary dividing point between the upper and lower 
echelons of the Magnesian government since any who cannot grasp these deeper 
things will be limited, at best, to lower-level bureaucratic positions or excluded 
altogether from politics. 
The Laws does not seek to establish a perfect polis on earth but sets about the 
task of detailing a next-to-perfect code of laws by which an imperfect, human 
society may be governed. We should not, as Field says, “draw any conclusions 
about a possible change in Plato’s views...we are expressly told that the provisions 
of the Republic still represent the ideal, but are not regarded as practicable in 
these circumstances”.58 Thus Magnesia is “second-best”. The importance of 
written law is brought to the forefront and, while there is ample discussion of 
rulers with superior moral knowledge, the nukterinos council does not function 
in precisely the same capacity as the philosopher kings/queens of the Republic. 
Law is virtually supreme, albeit less than perfect, and serves as the instrument for 
the moral and social regulation of society. Sufficient commentary on its theory 
and execution is provided as guidance for the future. The Athenian Stranger says 
that we should “order our private households and our public societies alike by 
obeying the immortal element within us, giving the name of law to the ordering 
of understanding”.59 The laws of Magnesia, grounded in eternal truths, govern 
the entire life of the community and they embody and express the philosophical 
vision of the Good. Or, at least, that was its author’s vision.
I am not suggesting that we emulate Plato’s second-best constitution. 
However, I feel that we could learn a great deal from it. This is true both in terms 
of its historical application in the development of our own polities and in terms 
of considerations for our future. There are many aspects of Magnesian society 
that are applicable today, such as careful town planning, quality education, 
fiscal responsibility, gender equality and an informed electorate. Maybe there 
is something too worth imitating in the degree of social responsibility for the 
general wellness and, interestingly, the happiness of its citizens by their state, 
not to mention the lively civic culture, even if it is partly a façade. However, 
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Magnesia’s potential for dystopia merits our greater attentions. The 20th century 
was subjected to some of the worst aspects of utopianism gone spectacularly and 
disastrously awry. Plato’s Laws may serve us both as a warning from the past as 
well as a blueprint for a brighter future, if perhaps in the sense of an object lesson 
on what to avoid. We ought to take its lessons to heart and keep a circumspect 
estimation of those who aim to dramatically reform society supposedly for its 
own good. n
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NOTES
1 See Laws 684d for the difficulty of land distribution; there are 5040 (a number divisible 
by 12, 10, etc.) administrative units for land-holdings by the citizens of the city (737e); 
each lot supports one family, the number of families is meant to remain at more or less 
a constant of 5040 (740b-c): one of the male children will inherit the holding and the 
females are given in marriage where appropriate; excess offspring will be obliged to 
emigrate (740d-e, 741). See Xen. Lak. Pol. I.9, VII.3-6 and Polyb., Hist. VI.45, 3-5, for a 
(reputedly) similar situation of land allotment in Sparta. See Moore (2005) chapter V
2  See Moore (2005) chapter V for more on this curious land-division as well as Aristotle’s 
objections to it
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3 See Moore (2005) chapter VI
4 (2002), 103; but see too Hansen (2006), 109, 177 n. 24
5 Athens maintained state-owned slaves for public works along with the archers who 
policed the city under the authority of the Eleven and other officials. See MacDowell 
(1978), 83. But Magnesia would either need to have a population of professional ‘builder 
slaves’ or else hire metics to undertake such work. They would cost (Hellenic) money as 
well as require accommodation within the city
6 See Hansen (2006), 109 for an overview of the problem of counting slaves in antiquity. 
On hoplites’ arms being carried by slaves, see Hdt. VII.229.1 and Thuc. VII.75.5.
7 (2002), p. 448
8 756c9-10; this process is quite elaborate and involves a random lottery at the final stage, 
after all the rounds of voting, to decide the candidates who then must be scrutinised, see 
below; see Plut. Solon XVIII.4-5 and ff., for this common democratic formula of “anyone 
who wishes” in Solon’s reforms 
9 764a-b
10 849a-b
11 934-5
12 755b ff
13 They are officially identified as functioning in a ‘watchdog’ capacity, making 
recommendations and keeping the ship of state ‘on course’ (960-65), but their actual 
power is nearly absolute—just below that of the laws. See Moore (2005) chapter III on 
their special education and II on their authority. In many ways, they are reminiscent of 
the Spartan Gerousia, see Cartledge (2001) pp. 34-5, 60, 84 on their powers
14 951d8-e4; see 813c6-8
15 (1970), pp. 5-14
16 On the selection and education of these Guardians of the Laws, see (for the female 
guardians) 783d ff. 794a ff., 930a ff., 932b-e, (and generally), 968c ff
17 Ath. Pol. VIII.4; see Plut. Solon 19.2. For the Areopagos prior to Solon, see Aristotle, 
Ath. Pol. III.6; and for the reference to Ephialtes see XXV.2. See Diod. XI.77.6, who 
adds a ‘moral’ to the story, saying that Ephialtes was punished for ‘attempting such 
lawlessness…he was done to death by night’
18 As has been proposed by Chase (1933), p. 135. Of course, we don’t actually know whether 
or not this institution of guardians in the Areopagos actually existed. See Morrow (1960), 
pp. 211-214
19 De Legibus III.46
20 See Cawkwell (1997), pp. 115-30 for a fuller discussion of this issue 
21 See Hodkinson (2000), pp. 56-57 on the ephors and their role in enforcing Spartan 
so¯phrosyne¯ 
22 (1960), pp. 526. See Richer (1999), pp. 99-100
23 See Moore (2005) chapter III
24  See Laws 908a, 909a, 951d ff., 961a ff. and 968a. For a similar ‘Nocturnal Council’ of 
Atlantis, see Critias 120a ff
25 That is, if Aristotle and Plutarch are to be believed, see Aristotle, Pol. 1270b; Plut. Lyk. 26.
26  Laws 960-65
27 (1998.
28 Ibid. On the name nukterinos see Laws 968a; for their meeting time see 951d
29  (1960), p. 509
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30 See Rhodes (1981), pp. 115, 376-7
31 (1986), p. 50. Although, Plato’s approach to it is markedly different
32 The Isokratean passages on the ‘ancestral constitution’ are assembled and examined 
in Jost (1936), pp. 140-45. See Rhodes (1981), pp. 323, 371-2, 421, 429-30 on Plato’s 
characterisation of Athenian politicians and views on oligarchy
33 Aristotle, Ath. Pol. XXXIV.3. See Rhodes (1981), pp. 375-7 
34 There are exceptions, as indicated above. E.g., Solon is mentioned eighteen times in the 
extant Platonic corpus with casual and friendly references. He was a good lawgiver, the 
alleged source of the Atlantis myth, a gnomic poet to be quoted and reputed to have been 
an honourable ancestor of Plato’s mother, Periktione. His legalistic theories represent 
a kind of ‘ancestral law’ that might be seen as influencing Plato. See Lambert (1993), 
pp. 316-17. See Hartog (1988), pp. 217, 219 on the Atlantis myths and their potential 
historical connections with Solon
35 The Dissoi Logoi, one of the only texts of the sophists to survive, also posits a hypothetical 
society that is antithetical to Athens (although not completely opposite), see Thomas 
(2000), pp. 130-1, 231
36 The Magnesians will not only study law. Plato’s narrator, as Nightingale (1999), p. 103, 
says, ‘even explicates the precise goal of this activity: one “studies” the law in order to 
become a better person and a better judge of the other kinds of logoi’
37 293b-299a
38 The proposed laws on medicine and navigation are to be displayed on kyrbeis (as laws 
were posted in Solon’s day) and on stelai (as in Plato’s)
39 (1986), pp. 51-52 
40 (1999), p. 102; see Laws 858a-859a
41 As the Athenian Stranger has done in the case of Solon’s laws, see Moore (2005) chapters 
V and VI
42 I borrow the phrase ‘more equal’ from Orwell’s Animal Farm and 1984. On the Athenian 
Stranger’s formulation of relativistic equality see Laws 744b ff., 757; see too Rep. 557a, 
561b-563
43 archas ho¯s…to¯ aniso¯ symmetro¯
44 E.g. funerary honours and state positions, see 744c4
45 He says that ‘the law has already granted him permission, and still gives permission, 
to choose whomever he wishes of the men and women of the state for that public 
commission’ (813c6-9)
46 951d8-e4. On the selection and training of this committee, see 951d-e, 952a, 961-69
47 Powell (1994), p. 280
48 See Xenophon (Lak. Pol. XIII.10-11), for similar travel restriction in his Lykourgian 
Sparta
49 963a7-11, c11-d2, 965b5-9, 965c9-e4, 966a5-10; cp. 631c ff. As opposed to five cardinal 
virtues in the Protagoras (see Protag. 349b, 359a)
50 See Rep. 484, 537b ff., where dialectics are described, as Bury says (1999, p. 555, n. 3), “as a kind 
of induction whereby the mind ascends from ‘the many’ particulars to ‘the one’ universal
  concept or ‘idea’: a comprehensive view of the whole that marks the dialectician”
51  966a5-10
52  966c5-7
53 This includes the text of the Laws itself and potentially the Republic, the Timaeus and 
others—966c1-9
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54 966d12-e3
55 967d4-8; see 903d
56 966e3-967e1; see 818a ff. and Rep. 607b-c
57 967e2-5; see 710a and Rep. 399
58 (1969), p. 74; see Laws 739a-740a, cp. 742c
59 714a1-2
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